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Abstract
Purpose – To avoid (costly) conflict, it is imperative to uncover when negotiators cooperate. The previous
study has shown that negotiators’ cooperative or competitive behavior is oftentimes guided by cues about
their counterpart; information about his/her traits or behavior. Using regulatory focus theory, this paper aims
to investigate when this is likely to happen. The authors hypothesize and test that because prevention focus
(rather than promotion focus) is associated with concerns for safety and concrete surroundings, it strengthens
the impact of counterpart cues.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors used two scenario studies and one behavioral negotiation
study to test the general hypothesis. The authors measured or manipulated participants’ regulatory focus,
manipulated counterpart cues by varying the information negotiators received about their counterpart’s traits
and behavior, andmeasured participants’ cooperative or competitive concessionmaking behavior.
Findings – Results from the studies confirmed that under prevention focus, negotiators’ cooperative
behavior depended on whether they received cooperative versus competitive counterpart cues more than
under promotion focus. Furthermore, results also showed that under prevention focus, negotiators’ behavior
was relatively unaffected by their own social motivation – i.e. their personal goal to obtain favorable outcomes
for oneself or for both negotiation parties.
Originality/value – By showing that regulatory focus determines when counterpart cues affect negotiation
behavior, this paper furthers the understanding of when contextual factors affect negotiators’ behavior. In
addition, it contributes to the understanding of the complex effects of prevention focus in interpersonal behavior.
Keywords Negotiation behaviour, Prevention focus, Counterpart cues, Contextual information
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
When considering conflict-based interactions, it is vital to understand how human
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constructive joint decisions can be reached. Given the importance of cooperative behavior in
conflict settings like negotiation, and the often devastating results when cooperation does
not occur, it is imperative to uncover what drives behavior in such settings.
To answer this question, on the one hand, some studies have pointed to personal cues
directly related to the focal negotiator, such as social motivation, as important drivers of
negotiation behavior and decisions (De Dreu et al., 2008). Social motivation relates to the
value individuals attach to their own and others’ outcomes. Most scholars distinguish pro-
social and pro-self-motivation (Aaldering et al., 2013; De Dreu, 2010; Lumsden et al., 2012).
When negotiators have a pro-social motivation, they emphasize maximizing both their own
and others’ outcomes, whereas when they have a pro-self-motivation, they emphasize
maximizing their own outcomes. In negotiations, prosocially motivated individuals have
been found to make more concessions to their counterpart, to engage in more problem-
solving behavior focused on integrating own and others’ outcomes, and to value negotiation
fairness and equality, more than pro-self-motivated individuals, who tend to view the
negotiation as a competitive game (De Dreu et al., 2000, 2006; Olekalns and Smith, 1999).
On the other hand, besides the social motives of the focal negotiator, previous research
has also pointed to variables related to the counterpart that cause negotiators to negotiate in
a constructive, cooperative manner or, in contrast, engage in destructive contending
behavior. Specifically, cues about the counterpart’s traits or about his or her cooperative or
competitive behavior have been shown to affect the opposing negotiator’s verbal expression
and behavior (Adair and Brett, 2005; Friedman et al., 2004; Pruitt, 1981; Tinsley et al., 2002).
For example, when sellers had a negative reputation, buyers expressed more anger during
disputes (Friedman et al., 2004), and when counterparts were perceived as being cooperative,
negotiators expressed more accurate and less inaccurate information than when
counterparts were perceived as being competitive (Steinel and De Dreu, 2004). In addition,
when negotiators were informed that their counterpart was an expert in distributive
negotiation (i.e. effective in using strategies aimed at claiming value), they acted in a more
distributive way, by exchanging less information, than when they did not receive such
information (Tinsley et al., 2002). Likewise, when counterparts are tough negotiators who
concede little, negotiators tend to respond in kind and make small, rather than large
concessions. In contrast, when counterparts behave cooperatively and make large
concessions, negotiators also were found to make large concessions (Van Kleef et al., 2004).
More in general, in mixed-motive settings such as negotiation, contextual factors can
promote or hinder cooperation by providing information about whether the counterpart is
willing to cooperate or not. Previous research indicates that individuals tend to match
counterparts’ expected motivational orientation or strategical behavior in terms of
cooperation and competition (Druckman, 1986; Pruitt and Lewis, 1975). This might be
because of the necessity to prevent exploitation or to adhere to the norm of reciprocity
(Weingart et al., 1990).
Although previous findings are informative for understanding the influence of both
personal and counterpart cues on negotiators’ behavior, they neglect when such influence
occurs. In the present research, we aim to contribute to the literature by examining when
negotiators’ behavior is influenced by cues related to the counterpart, rather than by
personal goals such as social motivation. Addressing this issue is not only important from a
theoretical point of view, as it would enable us to better understand when negotiators
behave constructively or not but also from a practical point of view. The specification of the
circumstances under which the counterpart cues (rather than personal cues) influence




steering negotiators toward a mutually satisfactory outcome, thereby avoiding costly
impasse or protracted conflict.
Regulatory focus and counterpart behavior
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1998) distinguishes between promotion focus goals,
which are directed at obtaining positive outcomes, and prevention focus goals, which are
directed at avoiding negative outcomes (Higgins et al., 1994). While promotion focused
individuals focus on their aspirations, growth and accomplishments, prevention focused
individuals are more concerned with protection, safety and responsibility.
Previous research demonstrated that promotion focused individuals are more self-
conscious and more likely to use first-person pronouns in a thought-listing task. In addition,
promotion focused individuals were found to be more likely to use a global, abstract
processing style (Förster and Higgins, 2005; Friedman and Förster, 2001). From this, it
follows that promotion focus is associated with increased accessibility of the self (Brebels
et al., 2008).
By contrast, prevention focused individuals because of their concern with safety,
vigilance and the avoidance of undesired outcomes (Crowe and Higgins, 1997; Scholer et al.,
2010), pay more attention to events in the surrounding environment to avoid or respond to,
potential threats. This reasoning is consistent with research showing that highly prevention
focused individuals tend to respond strongly to norm violations and reciprocate negative
behavior of their interaction partner (Keller et al., 2008). In addition, prevention focus has
been associated with a focus on details, a so-called local processing style, which, in turn, has
been associated with an increased focus on concrete surroundings and susceptibility to
contextual determinants of behavior (Förster et al., 2008; Förster and Higgins, 2005). That
those with a prevention focus would be more responsive to contextual cues is indeed,
suggested by a study by Beersma et al. (2013), which examined how prevention- and
promotion focused teams responded to different reward structures (individual versus team
rewards). While promotion-focused teams were found to be insensitive to reward structure
differences and performed effectively on a decision-making task regardless of reward
structure, prevention-focused teams experienced lower error intolerance, higher work
engagement, better team coordination and better performance under a team-rather than
individual reward structure.
In negotiation, several contextual factors can play an important role in affecting
negotiators’ behavior and decision-making, such as communication medium (Purdy et al.,
2000; Sheffield, 1995; Swaab et al., 2012), negotiator role (for example, buyer versus seller,
Appelt and Higgins (2010), and constituency presence (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt, 1984a). Studies
that have examined how regulatory focus moderates the way in which such contextual
factors affect negotiation behavior suggest that prevention-focused negotiators are more
sensitive to the negotiation context than promotion-focused negotiators. For example,
Appelt and Higgins (2010) found that prevention-focused negotiators behaved in a
more demanding way when they found themselves in a context that increased their
vigilance (i.e. when they had the buyer rather than the seller role in the negotiation), but in
a less demanding way when they found themselves in a context that reduced their vigilance
(i.e. when they had the seller rather than the buyer role). Trötschel et al. (2013), likewise,
found that prevention-focused negotiators behaved more demandingly during a negotiation
when they had reasons to believe they may not reach their goals than when they believed
they would reach their goals. Thus, previous research demonstrated that prevention-focused
negotiators negotiate in a tough, demanding way when the context they find themselves in






vigilance may be unnecessary, they “relax their vigilance” and behave in a less demanding
way.
One important contextual factor is the cues negotiators receive about their counterpart;
the information that becomes available regarding the counterpart’s traits and/or behavior.
Because of the interdependent structure of negotiation, an individual’s negotiation outcome
depends, at least in part, on the counterpart. It is, therefore, not surprising that past research
has shown that both counterpart traits (Friedman et al., 2004; Tinsley et al., 2002) and
counterpart behavior (Adair and Brett, 2005; Pruitt, 1981; Ten Velden et al., 2009; Van Kleef
et al., 2004) are important determinants of negotiators’ behavior and subsequent outcomes.
Previous research has, however, not examined whether prevention and promotion-focused
negotiators differ in the extent to which they are responsive to counterpart cues.
In line with Higgins’s (1998; see also Higgins et al., 1994) notion of regulatory focus,
we propose that relative to promotion-focused negotiators, prevention-focused
negotiators are more sensitive to cues pertaining to the counterpart. Because of their
concern for avoiding negative outcomes, prevention-focused negotiators should pay
more attention to information about others such as their counterpart’s profile and
behavior, to minimize losses. Indirect evidence supporting this reasoning comes from
previous work showing that prevention focused negotiators, but not promotion focused
negotiators, are more likely to avoid further negotiation when their counterpart
displays a tough, more competitive strategy, rather than a soft, more cooperative
strategy (Shalvi et al., 2013). Thus, we expect that negotiators’ behavior would be more
affected by information about the counterpart (i.e. the counterpart’s profile and
behavior) when they are characterized by prevention (versus promotion) focus. We
tested this general hypothesis in Studies 1 and 2.
In Studies 2 and 3, we tested an additional hypothesis concerning the type of information
considered. Specifically, we examined to what extent the behavior of prevention-focused
negotiators is influenced by information that is not instrumental in avoiding potential
losses, such as information about one’s own goals and motivation (i.e. personal cues). In this
regard, prevention-focused negotiators are expected to be more influenced by counterpart
cues than by personal cues due to their tendency to prevent negative outcomes and avoid
potential threats.
Study 1
Study 1 served as our first test of the idea that because of their hyper-vigilance, prevention
focused individuals are more likely to be influenced by counterpart cues than promotion-
focused negotiators.
We measured participants’ regulatory focus and manipulated counterpart cues by
presenting participants a cooperative versus a competitive profile of their counterpart.
Participants were asked their offer in a hypothetical negotiation scenario. Because
previous research has shown that negotiators tend to mimic their counterpart’s
behavior and/or traits (Steinel and De Dreu, 2004; Tinsley et al., 2002; Van Kleef et al.,
2004), and because we expected prevention focus to strengthen the effect of
counterpart cues, we expected that especially under prevention focus, negotiators
would be more cooperative (i.e. make a more cooperative offer) when they received
cues informing them that their counterpart was cooperative than when they received
cues that their counterpart was competitive. In other words, we predicted that
negotiators’ behavioral intentions would be more affected by information about the







A total of 150 adults (57 women, M = 35.75 years and SD = 9.72) were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and paid 0.7e for their participation. We determined the sample
size using G*power, based on 0.80 power, and the estimated effect size of 0.25, to test
the expected interaction between counterpart profile and regulatory focus, which would
require 128 participants. However, taking into consideration possible failed instruction
checks and failed survey completions (Paolacci et al., 2010), we collected data from 150
individuals. Participants were randomly assigned to a cooperative counterpart condition or
a competitive counterpart condition, and we measured participants’ self-reported regulatory
focus. Our dependent variable was participants’ negotiation offer.
Procedure, task and manipulation of counterpart’s profile
All instructions and measures were presented online. Participants first answered
demographic questions and filled out a regulatory focus questionnaire (RFQ) (Lockwood
et al., 2002). Next, we provided participants with a negotiation scenario. We asked
participants to imagine selling mobile phones, and that they had to negotiate with a
prospective buyer about three issues: price, warranty, and service contract (Table I).
Counterpart cues were operationalized by first having participants read a profile that
described their counterpart, as was done as in previous research (Steinel and De Dreu, 2004).
We asked participants to imagine that they had met the prospective buyer at a social
occasion previously, and that they remembered the buyer as “a pleasant and warm person
who was interested in other people and seemed to care about other people’s well-being”
(cooperative counterpart) or “an unpleasant and cold person who was interested only in
himself and did not appear to care about other people’s well-being” (competitive
counterpart). Second, this manipulation was supported by the described offer of
the counterpart – participants in the cooperative condition read that the counterpart had
made an offer of $450 (price), 20months (warranty) and $25 (service contract), which
constituted a value of 235 points for the participant. Participants in the competitive
condition read that the counterpart had made an offer of $400 (price), 24months (warranty)
and $10 (service contract), which constituted a value of 15 points for the participant.
Next, we asked participants to indicate what their counteroffer would be in such a
situation. Finally, participants answered an attention check to make sure they had read the





Price Warranty (in months) Service contract
Level Price ($) Pay-off Level Warranty Pay-off Level Service ($) Pay-off
1 600 400 1 10 120 1 50 240
2 575 350 2 12 105 2 45 210
3 550 300 3 14 90 3 40 180
4 525 250 4 16 75 4 35 150
5 500 200 5 18 60 5 30 120
6 475 150 6 20 45 6 25 90
7 450 100 7 22 30 7 20 60
8 425 50 8 24 15 8 15 30







Regulatory focus. Participants filled out the RFQ (Lockwood et al., 2002). This 18-item
questionnaire measures chronic regulatory focus on a nine-point scale (1 = not at all true of
me to 9 = very true of me). An example item is “I typically focus on the success I hope to
achieve in the future.” This scale consists of two subscales –a promotion focus scale, and a
prevention focus scale. Both scales proved reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96 and Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.92, respectively). Because both scales were highly correlated, r =0.46, p< 0.001,
and therefore, consistent with earlier research (Higgins et al., 2001; Shalvi et al., 2013), we
averaged all 18 items into one scale. Prevention focused items were recoded, and we
averaged the scores on the 18 items (Cronbach’s a = 0.94), so that a higher score indicated
more promotion focus and a lower score more prevention focus.
Offer. To analyze participants’ response to their counterpart’s offer, we transformed their
offer on the three issues (price, warranty and service contract) into points. Thus, a higher
offer meant the participant demanded more points, which constitutes a more competitive
demand[1].
Results
Treatment of the data
We removed nine participants for a lack of understanding of the set-up of the task, an
ineffective manipulation by taking too long or for not taking the task seriously[2]. The
analyses were thus, performed on the remaining 141 participants (M = 35.82 years,
SD= 9.89; 55 women).
Offer
H1 predicted that prevention focus would strengthen the effect of counterpart cues,
such that especially under prevention focus, participants would make a more cooperative
offer (i.e. would demand less) when they received cues that informed them that their
counterpart had a cooperative profile, rather than a competitive profile. To test this
hypothesis, we used hierarchical linear regression analyses, with a standardized regulatory
focus, counterpart profile, and the interaction as predictors, and the amount of points offered
as the dependent variable.
The analysis revealed, first of all, that participants in the cooperative counterpart
condition demanded less (M = 384.10, SD = 167.93), than participants in the competitive
counterpart condition (M = 451.96, SD = 194.61), ß = 0.18, t (137) = 2.30 and p = 0.02. This
main effect was qualified by the expected interaction between counterpart profile and
regulatory focus, ß = 0.18, t (137) = 2.22 and p = 0.03. Simple slopes analyses (using
61SD on the RFQ) revealed that for participants who scored high on the regulatory focus
(indicating more promotion focus), there was no effect of counterpart’s profile, b = 0.01,
t (137) = 0.09 and p = 0.93. However, as expected, for participants who scored low on
regulatory focus (indicating more prevention focus), there was an effect of counterpart’s
profile, b = 0.33, t (137) = 3.20 and p< 0.001, indicating that participants in the cooperative
counterpart condition demanded less than participants in the competitive counterpart
condition (Figure 1). Thus, these results supportedH1[3].
Discussion and introduction to Study 2
The results of our first study confirmed our expectations: prevention focused individuals,
but not promotion focused individuals, were affected by the counterpart cues we offered to




counterpart. Although these results thus, suggest that indeed, prevention focused
individuals are more sensitive to cues regarding their counterpart than promotion focused
individuals, this study leaves several questions unanswered. First of all, in this study, we
manipulated both the counterpart’s profile, as was done previously (Steinel and De Dreu,
2004), and the counterpart’s hypothetical behavior, by manipulating the first offer the
counterpart made. It is, therefore, unclear whether participants merely responded to
the obvious cooperative or competitive profile or the more subtle cooperative or competitive
behavior of the counterpart. The first goal of the second study was to investigate if
prevention focused individuals would also be more sensitive to the behavior of the
counterpart without any information about the profile. Second, the first study involved a
negotiation scenario, and we measured what negotiators’ offer would be in such a situation,
rather than actual behavior. In the second study, we examined actual negotiation behavior
over several rounds. Third, because regulatory focus was measured as a trait variable in
Study 1, we could not draw causal inferences. Therefore, in Study 2 we manipulated
negotiators’ promotion versus prevention focus. This also increases the robustness of our
findings by showing that a similar pattern of findings might emerge with different
methodological operationalizations of the same variable (i.e. measure and manipulation).
Fourth, in Study 1 we did not include any manipulation check. We address this issue in
Study 2 by asking participants about their perceptions of the counterpart. In sum, we
predicted that under prevention (versus promotion) focus, negotiators’ actual behavior
would be more affected by information about the counterpart’s behavior (H2).
Moreover, to exclude that prevention focused negotiators are more sensitive to, more
likely to abide to or more inclined to process any information even if not related to potential
threats, we included a second informational cue, in addition to the cue about the counterpart:
we manipulated negotiators’ social motivation, through instructions. Previous work has
shown that in addition to be a relatively stable individual difference variable, social
motivation can also be activated by features preceding the negotiation. For example, the
realization that negotiators have a past history or shared future together (Ben-Yoav and
Pruitt, 1984b; Fry et al., 1983) or instructions by superiors informing negotiators that they
should strive for equality, fairness and high joint outcomes, both activate a pro-social
motivation. In contrast, the lack of a past history or shared future and/or instructions
informing negotiators that they should strive for high individual outcomes, both activate a
pro-self-motivation (De Dreu et al., 2000). If in Study 2 we would find that prevention focus
strengthens the effect of our manipulation of social motivation, this would then suggest that
Figure 1.











prevention focused negotiators are more sensitive to any information, be it cues about the
counterpart or cues about their personal goals.
Method
Participants and design
119 University students (35 men, M = 21.50 years) participated for course credit or were
paid. This sample size (we aimed for 120 participants to test a 2  2 interaction) was based
on comparable studies in the field (De Dreu et al., 2006; Shalvi et al., 2013; Sinaceur, 2010;
Steinel and De Dreu, 2004; Van Kleef et al., 2004), and availability of the lab. Wemanipulated
participants’ regulatory focus (promotion vs. prevention focus), the counterpart’s concession
size (small vs. large concessions) and participants’ social motivation (pro-social vs pro-self),
as between-participants factors, and measured participants’ concessions over six
negotiation rounds.
Procedure, task and manipulation of counterpart’s concessions
Participants were seated in separate rooms behind a computer, on which they read that they
would engage in a computer-mediated negotiation with another participant. In reality, a
computer program simulated this other person.
The task was a computer-simulated multi-issue negotiation (Van Kleef et al., 2004), which
captures important characteristics of real-life negotiations (e.g. multiple issues and an offer-
counteroffer structure; Pruitt, 1981). All participants received the role of a student board’s
member who had to negotiate, on behalf of students, with a government representative about
three higher-education related issues: the amount of tuition students would have to pay each
year, the amount of government funding students would receive per month and for how
many months students would receive a public transport travel-card that would enable them
to travel for free (Table II). Participants were informed that their profits depended on the
decisions made for each of these issues. Furthermore, participants were informed that the
government would make the first offer, that they could respond with a counteroffer, and that










Level Tuition ($) Pay-off Level Funding ($) Pay-off Level Card Pay-off
1 1,600 280 1 650 280 1 60 280
2 1,725 260 2 625 260 2 58 260
3 1,850 240 3 600 240 3 56 240
4 1,975 220 4 575 220 4 54 220
5 2,100 200 5 550 200 5 52 200
6 2,225 180 6 525 180 6 50 180
7 2,350 160 7 500 160 7 48 160
8 2,475 140 8 475 140 8 46 140
9 2,600 120 9 450 120 9 44 120
10 2,725 100 10 425 100 10 42 100
11 2,850 80 11 400 80 11 40 80
12 2,975 60 12 375 60 12 38 60
13 3,100 40 13 350 40 13 36 40
14 3,225 20 14 325 20 14 34 20




The counterpart made the opening offer and proposed different options for the three issues
over six rounds. The options were pre-programmed and depended on the manipulation of
concession size (small vs large; Van Kleef et al., 2004). In the small-concessions condition, the
counterpart conceded 1 unit per round. Here, the counterpart’s opening offer was 15–15–14
(1 unit concession from the maximum 15–15–15), and the offer in the sixth and last round
was 13–14–12. In the large-concessions condition, the counterpart conceded 3 units per
round, starting with 14–15–13, and finishing with 9–10–8. Thus, across the 6 rounds, the
counterpart conceded a total of 6 units in the small-concession condition, whereas the
counterpart conceded a total of 18 units in the large-concession condition. The greater
number of units in the large-concession condition should lead participants to perceive the
behavior of the counterpart as more cooperative in comparison to the condition of small-
concessions. After round 6, negotiation was interrupted regardless of whether agreement
had been reached (Van Kleef et al., 2004). Then, we asked participants if they took the
negotiation seriously on a scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very serious (M = 6.15;
SD = 0.73). Thus, participants indicated to take the negotiation task very seriously.
Moreover, we did not find any effects of our independent variables or their interactions on
the extent to which participants indicated to have taken the task seriously (all ps > 0.15).
Hence, this variable is not discussed further.
Manipulation of regulatory focus and social motivation
To manipulate regulatory focus, participants in the prevention focus condition were asked
to “describe the negotiation behaviors and outcomes you want to avoid during this task.
Think about how you could prevent these behaviors and outcomes” (Galinsky et al., 2005).
Participants in the promotion focus condition were asked to “describe the negotiation
behaviors and outcomes you want to achieve during this task. Think about how you could
promote these behaviors and outcomes”.
To manipulate social motivation, participants in the pro-social condition received
instructions that it was important that both negotiators would achieve good outcomes.
Participants in the pro-self-condition received instructions that it was important to achieve
many points individually. Previous studies demonstrated that this manipulation
successfully induces a pro-social versus pro-self motivation with which negotiators enter the
situation (Beersma and De Dreu, 2002; Schei et al., 2011; Ten Velden et al., 2007; De Dreu
et al., 2000).
Dependent measures
Manipulation checks. Four items checked the manipulation of counterpart’s concession size
(e.g. “My counterpart made large concessions”; 1 = completely disagree to 7 = completely
agree; Cronbach’s a = 0.85). Five items checked the manipulation of social motivation
(Beersma and De Dreu, 2002; De Dreu et al., 2006; e.g. “I tried to achieve many points for both
of us” and “I tried to achieve as many points for myself as possible” [reverse-coded];
Cronbach’s a = 0.77; 1 = completely disagree, to 7 = completely agree). To check the
manipulation of regulatory focus, a coder, blind to conditions, coded all written statements
into a promotion or prevention-related statements. The written statements were also coded
by a second coder to provide a test of reliability. Reliability was measured by Krippendorff’s
alpha. The manipulation check for regulatory focus met Krippendorff’s (1980) standards of
reliability, a = 0.96, indicating high agreement.
Concession making. Distance traveled reflected participants’ concession making (Ten






demands (converted into points) during rounds one and six. Higher distance traveled
indicated larger overall concessions made, and thus, indicated more cooperative behavior[4].
Results
Handling of data
Following previous research procedures, participants who reached an agreement before
round six (n= 1) were excluded from the sample (Van Kleef et al., 2004). We further excluded
three participants because they failed to comply with instructions and wrote nonsense
during an essential phase of the experiment (i.e. the writing task used to manipulate
regulatory focus), and one participant was an extreme outlier (Z> 5) on the main dependent
variable (concessions made)[5].
Manipulation checks
ANOVA revealed that pro-social participants scored higher on the manipulation check for
social motivation, indicating more pro-social (M = 3.53, SD = 1.37), than pro-self-motivation
(M = 2.44. SD = 1.01), F (1, 106) = 22.25 and p < 0.001, h 2 = 0.17. No other effects were
significant.
A second ANOVA revealed that participants in the large concessions condition reported
larger concessions made by their counterpart (M = 3.78, SD = 1.15) than participants in the
small concessions condition (M = 2.41, SD = 1.18), F (1, 106) = 39.61 and p < 0.001,
h 2 = 0.27. No other effects were significant.
A Chi-square analysis of the coded statements revealed a significant effect of regulatory
focus condition, x 2 (1, N = 90) = 64.19, p < 0.001. In both conditions, > 91 per cent of
participants correctly wrote about promotion or prevention focused behaviors.
Concession making
To again test our hypothesis that prevention focused negotiators would be more sensitive to
the counterpart’s concessions, we performed a custom-built 2 (pro-social vs pro-self-
motivation)  2 (promotion vs prevention focus)  2 (counterpart cues: small vs large
concession size) ANOVA including main effects and all two-way interactions on the
concessions negotiators made. Including the regulatory focus X social motivation
interaction allowed us to test whether under prevention focus, not only negotiators are more
sensitive to all information, and but also environmental cues. The analysis revealed, first of
all, that pro-social negotiators made larger concessions (M = 166.79, SD = 102.14) than pro-
self-negotiators (M = 106.21, SD = 104.11), F (1, 107) = 11.40, p = 0.001 and h 2 = 0.096.
Furthermore, social motivation interacted with the counterpart’s concession size, F (1, 107) =
4.76, p = 0.031 and h 2 = 0.043. Simple effects revealed that for pro-self-negotiators, the
counterparts’ concession size did not affect concessions, F (1, 107) = 0.60, p = 0.439.
However, pro-social negotiators made larger concessions when their counterpart made large
concessions (M = 195.56, SD = 90.86) than when their counterpart made small concessions
(M= 140.00, SD= 106.23), F (1, 107) = 5.26, p= 0.024 and h 2 = 0.047.
As expected, ANOVA revealed an interaction between regulatory focus and the
counterpart’s concessions, F (1, 107) = 4.26, p = 0.041and h 2 = 0.038. For promotion focused
negotiators, the counterpart’s concessions did not affect concession making, F (1, 107) =
0.46, p = 0.499. However, supporting H1 and consistent with the results of Study 1,
prevention focused negotiators made larger concessions when their counterpart made large
concessions (M = 156.67, SD = 109.68), than when their counterpart made small concessions




Finally, ANOVA revealed an interaction between regulatory focus, and participants’
social motivation, F (1, 107) = 9.42, p = 0.003 and h 2 = 0.081. For prevention focused
negotiators, social motivation did not affect concession making, F (1, 107) = 0.05, p = 0.828.
However, and unexpected, promotion focused negotiators made larger concessions when
they had a pro-social motivation (M = 203.70, SD = 87.18), than when they had a pro-self-
motivation (M= 86.90, SD= 105.46), F (1, 107) = 20.34, p< 0.001 and h 2 = 0.160[6].
Discussion and introduction to Study 3
In Study 2, we set out to provide an additional test of our hypothesis, and replicate our
findings from the first study, which showed that especially prevention focused individuals
were sensitive to counterpart cues. We manipulated (rather than measured) regulatory focus
and included a behavioral measure as our main dependent variable. Furthermore, we tested
a potential alternative explanation for our finding, by testing whether under prevention
focus, negotiators would be more sensitive to any type of information, including information
about their personal goals (i.e. their social motivation).
Findings supported H1 and replicated the findings from Study 1: using actual
negotiation behavior over several rounds as the dependent variable, we showed that
counterpart cues, in this case the counterpart’s concession size, were more influential in
affecting negotiators’ concession making under prevention focus, than under promotion
focus. Thus, using two different studies, one scenario study and one behavioral study, we
find consistent evidence supporting our prediction. Furthermore, we also showed that under
prevention focus, not all information is regarded equal: instructions pertaining to the
negotiator’s personal goal – their social motivation – were not more influential under
prevention focus. In contrast, and unexpectedly, Study 2 revealed that promotion focus
seemed to strengthen the effect of our social motivation manipulation. In Study 3 we set out
to test the robustness of this finding.
Method
Participants and design
We recruited adult participants through Prolific, an online research platform similar to
Amazon’s M-Turk. Participants were paid 1.3£ for their participation. We determined the
sample size using G*power, based on 0.80 power, and the estimated effect size of 0.25, which
would require 128 participants to test an interaction between regulatory focus and social
motivation. In total, 226 participants signed up for the study. In total, 79 Participants failed
Figure 2.
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the attention check (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and were removed from the sample before any
analysis took place. Accordingly, these participants did not receive payment either, in
accordance with Prolific’s policy and the local Ethics Review Board’s policy, resulting in a
total of 147 participants (75 women,M= 28.67 years, SD= 5.6).
Participants were randomly assigned to a pro-social condition or a pro-self-condition, and
we measured their’ self-reported regulatory focus using the RFQ (Higgins et al., 2001). We
measured (rather than manipulated) regulatory focus to avoid running two back-to-back
manipulations in an online experiment that potentially suffers from a reduced degree of
control over participants’ attention and dedication. Moreover, to avoid mono-
operationalization bias, we used a different measure of regulatory focus than the one we
used in Study 1 (i.e. the 18-item scale developed by Lockwood et al., 2002). Our dependent
variable was participants’ negotiation offer.
Procedure, task and manipulation of counterpart’s profile
All measures and instructions were presented online. Participants first answered
demographic questions and filled out an RFQ (Higgins et al., 2001). Next, we provided
participants with the same negotiation scenario as in Study 1. We asked participants to
imagine selling mobile phones, and that they had to negotiate with a prospective buyer
about three issues: price, warranty and service contract. The manipulation of
participants’ social motivation was done as in previous research and as was done in
Study 2 (Beersma and De Dreu, 2002; Schei et al., 2011; Ten Velden et al., 2007; De Dreu
et al., 2000).
Next, we asked participants to indicate what their offer would be for all three issues.
Finally, participants answered an attention check (Oppenheimer et al., 2009), and were paid
for participation.
Measures
Regulatory focus. Participants filled out the RFQ (Higgins et al., 2001). This 11-item
questionnaire measures chronic regulatory focus orientation on a five-point scale. The
RFQ contains two psychometrically distinct subscales. The promotion subscale
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.68) measures individuals’ subjective histories of promotion success
with items such as “How often have you accomplished things that got you ‘psyched’’ to
work even harder?” (1 = never or seldom, 5 = very often) and “I feel like I have made
progress toward being successful in my life” (1 = never true, 5 = very often true). The
prevention subscale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.62) measures individuals’ subjective histories
of prevention success with items such as “How often did you obey rules and regulations
that were established by your parents?” and “Not being careful has gotten me into trouble
at times” (reverse scored). As in Study 1, we recoded the prevention items for the two
scales to be combined to form one scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.65), so that a higher score
on this combined scale indicated more promotion focus and a lower score more
prevention focus.
Manipulation check. As in Study 2, we used five items to check the manipulation of social
motivation (Beersma and De Dreu, 2002; De Dreu et al., 2006; e.g. “I tried to achieve many
points for both of us” and “I tried to achieve as many points for myself as possible” [reverse-
coded]; Cronbach’s a = 0.80; 1 = completely disagree, to 7 = completely agree).
Offer. To analyze participants’ offer, we transformed their offer on the three issues (price,
warranty, and service contract) into points. Thus, a higher offer meant the participant





Treatment of the data
We removed 1 participant from the analyses because this person did not demand any points
(Z > 4)[7]. The analyses were thus, performed on the remaining 146 participants (M =
28.63 years, SD= 5.63; 74 women).
Manipulation check
We performed a hierarchical linear regression analyses, with a standardized regulatory
focus, participants’ social motivation, and the interaction as predictors, using the
manipulation check for social motivation as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed a
main effect of participants’ social motivation, ß = 0.40, t= 5.20 and p< 0.001, indicating that
pro-social participants reported higher pro-social motivation (M= 3.54, SD= 1.21), than pro-
self-participants (M = 2.54, SD = 1.09). No other effects were significant, all 1.41> t <
1.04, all p> 0.16.
Offer
The results of Study 2 suggested that participants’ social motivation would be more
influential under promotion focus, than under prevention focus. To check the robustness of
this finding, we tested whether promotion focused negotiators would make a more
cooperative offer (i.e. would demand less) when they had a pro-social motivation, rather than
a pro-self-motivation. We used hierarchical linear regression analyses, with a standardized
regulatory focus, participants’ social motivation, and the interaction as predictors and the
amount of points offered as the dependent variable. This analysis revealed a significant
main effect of participants’ social motivation, ß =0.23, t =2.82 and p = 0.005, indicating
that pro-social participants demanded less (M = 606.67, SD = 140.03), than pro-self
participants (M = 673.17, SD = 142.98). However, no other effects were significant, all t <
0.16, all p> 0.87.
We also performed a hierarchical linear regression analysis with the standardized
promotion focus subscale, participants’ social motivation, and the interaction as predictors
and the amount of points offered as the dependent variable. In addition, we added the
participants’ prevention focus as a control variable. The analysis revealed the same main
effect of participants’ social motivation, ß = 0.23, t = 2.83 and p = 0.005, but no other
effects were significant, all t< 0.42, all p> 0.65.
Finally, we explored whether higher prevention focus would make participants more
responsive to their social motivation. We used hierarchical linear regression analyses, with
standardized prevention focus, participants’ social motivation, and the interaction as
predictors and the amount of points offered as the dependent variable. In addition, we added
participants’ promotion focus as a control variable. Again, the main effect for participants’
social motivation was significant, ß = 0.23, t = 2.83 and p = 0.005, but no other effects
were significant, all t < 0.52, all p > 0.60. All in all, these results do not replicate our finding
regarding promotion focus strengthening the influence of social motivation found in Study 2.
General discussion
Our results showed that depending on individuals’ regulatory focus, counterpart cues are
influential in affecting negotiation behavior. In two studies, using different methodological
approaches (i.e. a self-report questionnaire in Study 1, and an experimental manipulation in
Study 2), we showed that prevention rather than promotion focus strengthens the effects of
cues about the counterpart. More specifically, when negotiators were prevention focused, but






pattern (Study 2) determined negotiation behavior, such that negotiators demanded less and
conceded more when their counterpart had a cooperative profile or made large concessions
than when their counterpart had a competitive profile or made small concessions. Replicating
these results with different operationalizations of regulatory focus provides robust evidence
for its role in influencing the negotiator’s behavior.
These results are consistent with, and complementary to, previous findings on
regulatory focus and negotiation (discussed earlier) that suggest that prevention-focused
negotiators negotiate in a tough, demanding way when the context they find themselves in
informs them that vigilance is warranted, but seem to “relax their vigilance” and behave in a
less demanding way when they receive cues that signal that this is possible (Appelt and
Higgins, 2010; Trötschel et al., 2013). The present research thus supports previous findings
and extends them by examining negotiators’ reactions to cues regarding their counterpart.
Indeed, we provide evidence that “context matters” to prevention-focused negotiators:
counterpart cues such as characteristics and behaviors influence their behavior.
From a theoretical point of view, our results provide new insights into the role of
regulatory focus in driving negotiators’ behavior. The current work speaks to the
importance of regulatory focus in affecting cooperative behavior in mixed-motive decision-
making settings such as negotiation. Previous work investigating the role of regulatory
focus in negotiation demonstrated, for example, that those with a prevention focus are more
likely to show negotiation avoidance (Shalvi et al., 2013), and are more likely to exit the
negotiation when the counterpart is a tough negotiator. Furthermore, negotiators with a
promotion focus achieve higher outcomes in both distributive and integrative negotiations
(Galinsky et al., 2005). The current research extends this previous work by showing that the
role of regulatory focus, and particularly prevention focus in negotiation is more complex:
prevention focused negotiators’ behavior is affected by external cues, such as information
about the counterpart. However, it also appears that prevention focused negotiators’
vigilance and receptiveness is limited to information about others, rather than instructions
pertaining to their personal goals. Indeed, our results did not show any indication that
prevention focus would strengthen the effects of negotiators’ social motivation. One could
argue that information intended to affect negotiators’ motivation may convey clues about
the optimal motivational orientation to be hold during the negotiation, and this may be
important information. However, prevention focused negotiators’ behavior was not affected
by this information, possible because it does not entail a threat to be vigilant about. In
contrast, counterpart characteristics and behaviors need to be carefully scrutinized to
exclude the presence of potential obstacles and threats.
In one study (Study 2) we found that promotion focus strengthened the effect of our social
motivation instructions. One potential explanation for this is that promotion focus is
associated with a focus on aspirations and goals (Higgins et al., 1994), which may be
connected to motivation and values (Crowe and Higgins, 1997; Scholer et al., 2010). Previous
work has shown that indeed, social motivation is associated with the activation of an
abstract goal and general schema through which the negotiation is interpreted (De Dreu
et al., 2007). Building on the established association between promotion focus and both self-
accessibility and abstract processing, we could argue that an abstract and self-relevant
guide of behavior, such as social motivation, could thus, have a stronger impact when
negotiators are promotion focused than when they are prevention focused. Put differently,
promotion focus could lead pro-socially motivated negotiators, who value joint success, to
behave more cooperatively, than pro-self-motivated negotiators, who value individual
performance and self-interest. However, because this effect was not replicated in Study 3, we




this finding and to further explore the role of regulatory focus and social motivation in
influencing negotiators’ behavior. For example, it may be interesting to focus on the link
between regulatory focus and social motivation by investigating whether and how
promotion and prevention focus are associated with pro-self and pro-social motivation.
Because prevention-focused people are particularly sensitive to obligations and
responsibilities, they could be motivated to behave “pro-other” than “pro-self” to a higher
extent (Beersma et al., 2013).
An important practical implication of our findings is that when negotiators are
prevention-focused, interventions aimed at inducing a pro-social motivation (such as
instructions by third parties; Beersma and De Dreu, 2002; De Dreu et al., 2006) are less likely
to work. Prevention-focused negotiators apparently are more likely to directly react to what
they observe in the negotiation than to the abstract frame with which they enter the
negotiation. This is especially relevant for those negotiating with counterparts who feel
powerless or threatened; for these negotiators, who presumably are prevention focused
(Keltner et al., 2003; Neubert et al., 2008), what one does during the negotiation is more
influential in affecting behavior than how the negotiation is framed. Our results thus, help to
clarify when and “actions speak louder than words” to get a counterpart to negotiate
constructively. This implies consequences for both the negotiator and his/her counterpart,
as well as for society as a whole; our data show that when negotiators are prevention-
focused, they are very receptive to cues about their counterpart. Information that the
counterpart intends to be cooperative can then be used to steer the negotiation toward
cooperative behavior and constructive outcomes. At the same time, such positive effects are
not expected when negotiators have a promotion focus; for them, offering counterpart cues
does little to affect their behavior.
Limitations and future directions
The first limitation of the present research involves the scenario used in Studies 1 and 3.
Following Steinel and De Dreu’s (2004) procedure, we manipulated the counterpart’s profile
by varying information about the counterpart’s traits and behavior. Thus, participants were
randomly presented with a cooperative counterpart or a competitive counterpart. Although
the overall pattern is consistent with our prediction that prevention focused negotiators,
rather than promotion focused negotiators, will be influenced by cues about the counterpart
in determining one’s own behavior, from these studies we cannot conclude whether the
results were caused by the counterpart’s traits or behavior.
Another limitation is that our use of scenario studies raises questions about whether the
observed effects will hold true in real social interaction contexts. Indeed, replicating our
results in an actual interactive negotiation is an important avenue for future research.
Related to this, we would like to encourage future research to explore whether the present
findings can be replicated in both distributive and integrative negotiations. Speculating
about potential findings, the structure of the negotiation (distributive vs. integrative) could
be considered as a contextual cue that might be more influential for prevention focused
individuals.
It should be noted that the manipulation checks in Studies 2 and 3 indicated that the
mean of the groups was never above the scale midpoint (e.g. three on a seven-point scale).
Because we were mainly interested in examining differences between groups, the fact that
the manipulation check scores are not above average should not affect the validity of our
conclusions. Nevertheless, it would be intriguing to know whether higher means on the







Also, although higher than the conventional cut-off point of 0.60, the reliability of the
regulatory focus measure used in Study 3 is low (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.65). It is not unusual
that the RFQ (Higgins et al., 2001) is characterized by low reliability (Semin et al., 2005).
However, this scale is very often adopted in academia and we believed it was important to
keep continuity with previous research. However, we also believe it is relevant for
researchers interested in the effects of regulatory focus in future studies to mention this
limitation here.
Finally, it would be interesting to test whether other variables such as negotiators’
emotions could account for the effects we observed here. In line with regulatory focus
literature (Crowe and Higgins, 1997; Scholer et al., 2010), we argued that prevention-focused
negotiators are more sensitive to counterpart cues because they fear undesired outcomes.
Because of their concern with safety and vigilance, emotions such as fear and anxiety could
lead prevention-focused negotiators to pay more attention to counterpart cues to avoid
potential losses. In contrast, emotions like greed could drive negotiators’ behavior when they
are high in promotion focus. Because of their increased focus on the self, feelings of greed
could explain why promotion-focused negotiators are insensitive to counterpart cues. Future
research could explore this potential psychological process accounting for our results.
Conclusion
One of the most influential determinants of negotiation outcomes is the degree to which
negotiators cooperate. Past research has identified contextual factors, such as the
counterpart’s traits and/or behavior, as an important driving force of negotiation behavior.
Using scenario and behavioral studies, we identified under what conditions counterpart cues
become more important. We argued and showed that regulatory focus moderates the effects
of both counterpart traits and/or behavior, such that under prevention focus, negotiators
react to their counterpart: when their counterpart is cooperative, they act more cooperatively
than when their counterpart is competitive.
Notes
1. We also assessed participants’ social value orientation (SVO) (Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994)
and report the measure and results here as we did not formulate hypotheses related to SVO.
Participants filled in the nine-item decomposed-game measure (Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994)
and were categorized as pro-social, individualistic or competitive, when they made at least six
consistent choices in). We combined individualists and competitors into one category (pro-self;
De Dreu and Van Lange, 1995; Giacomantonio et al., 2010; Van Lange, 1999).
2. Three participants indicated that English was not their primary language, one participant
indicated primary school as highest education, one participant did not make any negotiation
offer, three participants took too long to complete the study (Z > 3), which renders the
manipulation of the counterpart’s profile ineffective, and one participant showed an obvious
answering pattern by answering every question with six. Including these nine participants, the
interaction between regulatory focus and counterpart profile became marginally significant,
ß =0.15, t (146) =1.79 and p = 0.075.
3. We also analyzed the effects of regulatory focus on negotiation offers controlling for SVO. In
total, 11 participants did not make 6 or more consistent choices on the SVO measure and could
thus, not be classified as either pro-social or pro-self (Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994). Thus, these
participants could not be included in the analyses. The results show that that the interaction
between regulatory focus and counterpart profile remains significant in this analysis as well,




focus would moderate the effect of SVO. This interaction was not significant, ß = 0.12, t (126) =
1.54 and p = 0.13.
4. As auxiliary measures not central to our hypothesis, we measured participants’ mood using the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Watson, Clark and Tellegen, 1988). Participants
indicated, on a scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 5 = very much their positive (e.g. “enthusiastic”)
and negative (e.g. “afraid”) affect. Reliability of both scaled was good, Cronbach’s a = 0.80 for
positive affect, and Cronbach’s a = 0.87 for negative affect. Moreover, we measured participants’
perceptions about their counterpart using 11 items: “The other is nice/dumb (R)/easy going/special/
friendly/predictable/intelligent/average/boring (R)/interesting/competitive (R)” (Cronbach’s a =
0.63). Answers could be given on seven-point scales, ranging from 1 = completely disagree to 7 =
completely agree.
5. Including these participants, the regulatory focus X concession size interaction becomes
marginally significant, F (1, 110) = 3.391, p = 0.068 and h 2 = 0.03 (simple effect for prevention
focus: F (1, 110) = 3.96, p = 0.049 and h 2 = 0.035). The regulatory focus X social motivation
interaction remains significant, F (1, 110) = 10.212, p = 0.002 and h 2 = 0.09.
6. Regarding the auxiliary measures, a multivariate analysis of variance of the PANAS data
revealed, first of all, that pro-social negotiators experienced less positive affect (M = 3.72, SD =
0.49) than pro-self negotiators (M = 3.89, SD = 0.47), F (1, 107) = 3.74, p = 0.056 (marginal) and
h 2 = 0.034. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between social motivation and
concession size on negative affect, F (1, 107) = 5.28, p = 0.024 and h 2 = 0.047. Simple effects
analysis showed that for pro-self negotiators, concession size did not influence negotiators’
negative affect, F (1, 107) = 0.99, p = 0.323. However, pro-social negotiators reported more
negative affect when counterparts made small concessions (M = 1.56, SD = 0.45) than when they
made large concessions (M = 1.30, SD = 0.26), F (1, 107) = 5.03, p = 0.027 and h 2 = 0.045. No
other effects on either scale were significant, all Fs < 3.19, ps > 0.076. An ANOVA on the
auxiliary perceptions of the counterpart revealed a main effect for concession size, F (1, 107) =
12.03, p = 0.001 and h 2 = 0.101, indicating that when counterparts made large concessions they
were perceived more positive (M = 4.15, SD = 0.61) than when counterparts made small
concessions (M = 3.76, SD = 0.55). No other effects were significant, all Fs< 1.44, ps> 0.233.
7. Including these participants, the interaction between social motivation and regulatory focus was
not significant, ß = 0.01, t (143) = 0.07 and p = 0.87.
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